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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES

Professor Münsterberg¹ has at last broken a rule of his literary career. Hitherto, as he says himself in the Preface of the book now in review, he has presented a case of a double personality. Writing in English he has produced "only light books and essays;" writing in German, "scholarly papers and systematic works;" and "neither [of his two writers] knew what the other was doing." Now, however, as if a scion of Aristotle's *πρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, he has undertaken the English translation of his recent German work, *Philosophie der Werte*, published at Leipzig in 1908. Those two writers, the American of real life and the German of serious thought and "scholarly formulation," have at last found each other out and have consented to an alliance. Moreover, not inappropriately, the alliance has been effected through a scholar's study of values, of "the eternal values."

Both the German work and the English work are dedicated to Josiah Royce—"in friendship of heart and thought." In 1892 Professor Royce published *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, and in this book dwelt, not of course originally, but at length and with effective emphasis, on the distinction between "the world of description and the world of appreciation" (chap. xii). The same year Professor Münsterberg came to Harvard and in 1899 published his *Psychology and Life* in which constantly and vigorously he made use of the same distinction and of various elaborations of it. If his position then or later in his more technical attempt² to save psychology from "real life" and from the "psychologism" in which so many among teachers and preachers, whose contact was with real life, were indulging even to excess, was open to any special criticism, he must be said to have taken Royce's distinction too literally or too seriously. In the first instance he said this: "To mix values with laws destroys not only the causal links but also the values" (p. 268). In the second, this: "Die Wirklichkeit bietet nur abhängige Objekte der Stellungnahme und Akte, die wir verstehen und würdigen; die Psychologie—und dasselbe gilt von der Physik—kann es mit der logisch primären wirklichen Erfahrung also gar nicht zu thun haben" (p. 56).

And yet now in this latest work something very like a mixture of values and laws, of real experience and logical uniformities, is undertaken. Perhaps Professor Münsterberg cannot be said exactly to have been guilty

¹ *The Eternal Values*. By Hugo Münsterberg. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1909. x+436 pages. \$2.50.

² *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1900.

of so offensive a thing as psychologism, but with a standpoint and a body of concepts only more general than that of his descriptive and explanatory science of psychology he has applied himself seriously and always vigorously to the same sort of thing, and certainly his general logism can be no more worthy than what he has so often decried. He has become inconsistent, then, and of course he may claim the right of inconsistency. His "new idealistic standpoint" (p. vii) may require such a break with his past. But, be this as it may, there is no room for doubt that at last he would somehow unite the life and the thought, the reality and the logical transformations, which once he so boldly distinguished as brutally to put them asunder. Possibly through all the years he was only waiting until they, like his America and his Germany, should have proved worthy of each other, but this is the year of the alliance—at least by the book.

What says the book? Briefly put, all value depends on relationship to will. In the purposes controlling the wills of individuals there are no absolute values. Only the over-personal will is purposive with absolute values. "We have a world with over-personal, unconditional value or we have no real world at all" (p. 46). "To understand the absolute values means to understand how our will can become an over-personal demand which, without reference to anyone's personal pleasure or displeasure, finds its satisfaction in truth and beauty and morality and religion" (p. 64). Interest in identity, or in the recurrence of identity, and the realization of this, show in us all the over-personal will as well as the satisfaction of such a will. "What provides . . . identity is . . . valuable" (p. 74). To "seek the identity of experience" is "the one fundamental act which secures for us a world. It is the one act which we cannot give up and yet which has nothing whatever to do with personal pleasure or pain. [With an over-personal will] we demand that there be a world; that means that our experience be more than just the passing experience, that it assert itself in its identity in new experiences. Here is the one original deed which gives eternal meaning to our reality, and without which our life would be an empty dream, a chaos, a nothing" (p. 75). And from this "one original deed," from this "deciding fact," all else in the world of values follows. Thus the eternal values are these: *logical values*, or values of conservation or of identity with self, belonging to the existence of things and persons and over-personal wills and to the connections among these parts as presented respectively in nature and in history and in the system of reason; *aesthetic values*, or values of agreement or of the identity of parts among themselves, belonging to unity as present in natural harmony and in personal love and in an over-personal happiness

and to beauty as present in the fine arts and in literature and in music; *ethical values*, or values of realization or of "identity in change," belonging to development as growth and as progress and as self-development and to achievement, "the intentional securing of this development," as shown in industry and in law and in morality; and, lastly, *metaphysical values*, or values of completion or of the identity of the logical and the aesthetic and the ethical with each other, these last belonging to holiness, or wholeness and self-perfection, as given in creation and in revelation and in salvation and to absoluteness, to the absoluteness of the world as a self-asserted whole, of mankind "viewed metaphysically" (p. 416), and of the will of the "over-self." The will of the over-self, the over-personal will, is thus the source and the climax of all true value and of all reality. Value is not in what is given to merely personal experience, but in what is performed or ever to be performed by the over-personal self. "We find in ourselves the over-self in the blending allness of values" (p. 421). "The total outer world resounds with the will of the beings. But [the] eternal unity of outer world and fellow-world and inner world in the whole richness of their connections and unities and realizations would never have been possible if they were not all flowing from the same eternal absolute deed of the over-self" (p. 430).

So speaks the book, a book sure to attract attention. So runs Professor Münsterberg's interesting logism, always ingenious when not also brilliant, and in the freedom of it he has successfully transformed the world of values, making that world meet the demands of his selected principle of identity, so long known as a principle of the formal logic and so useful as the fundamental working hypothesis of all positive science. If he has not always been loyal to the demands of his principle, if he has sometimes meant more and sometimes less than he has actually said, if his predilection for identity and hypostasis has made his over-self too superior to be really so and his unconditional values so absolute as to be no longer vital, if in his doctrine of the superpersonal will he has been a pragmatist, making his debt, if not to James, then to Fichte, at least as large as that to Royce, but too good a pragmatist to mingle with the common herd, and if in general his absolutism has overreached itself by its anti-relativism, all these lapses or all these matters of possible criticism—depending on point of view—may be passed over. There is still left, to name it once more, the fact, glaring and rudely obtrusive, of his over-vigorous logism and Professor Münsterberg's wide circle of readers, German and American, must hope that in the fulness of time he will write

not again on "Psychology and Life," but more broadly on "Logic and Life." Logism—is it, like psychologism, "one of the greatest dangers of our time"?

ALFRED H. LLOYD

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RITSCHL'S HISTORY OF PROTESTANT DOCTRINE

Professor Ritschl has projected a series of three volumes which will describe the development of Protestant theology up to the time of the Evangelical Union. The first volume¹ is occupied with the history of "old-Protestant" doctrine.

In the Prolegomena the author advocates the broader interpretation of the term *dogma* which makes it applicable to established Protestant doctrine. He justifies his undertaking on the ground that Harnack's view of dogma led him to bring his great work to a close with the Reformation, while Loofs and Seeberg trace Lutheran doctrine no farther than the Formula of Concord (1580) and the Reformed doctrine only to the Formula Consensus Helvetica (1675). The greater interest hitherto taken in ancient Catholic theology stands to the discredit of Protestant writers.

Ritschl finds four "instances" (ideal and real factors) operating in the development of Protestant dogma: (1) Holy Scripture, through the widely differing views of the quintessence of the Scriptures held by Lutherans, Reformed, Anabaptists, Socinians, Pietists, Mystics, and Rationalists; (2) the dogmatical tradition of the "old-Catholic" church; (3) saving faith; (4) the universal human reason. Only the first two of these are considered in the present volume.

While it may be uncertain who was the first Protestant thinker to elaborate a doctrine of inspiration it was universally accepted in the early part of the sixteenth century. The question whether inspiration was literal or substantial issued in four different contentions:

The Melancthonian view was that the Word of God was given to men in the personal preaching of his messengers, without special emphasis on the idea that the Scriptures contained the divine Word. In his *Loci* Melancthon did not discuss the place of the Scriptures, but he commonly assumes that they are the Word of God with respect to history and doctrine, and he tests all tradition and conciliar decisions by them. Georg Major

¹ *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*. Vol. I. Prolegomena. By Otto Ritschl. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1908. vii + 410 pages. \$2.60.